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INTRODUCTION

This article provides a description of state automobile insurance reparations systems, specifically analyzing the performance of
Minnesota's no-fault law in the context of its effect on insurance
claiming patterns. In addition, it compares the value to consumers
of the reparations system and related insurance coverages in Minnesota with the value to consumers of the more modest, traditional
financial responsibility and tort law system in Wisconsin. The article
also discusses public policy considerations relevant to strengthening the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. In the latter context, subjects addressed include the exclusive verbal tort
threshold, managed medical care, and similar measures that have
been examined or tried in other no-fault states.
II.

HISTORY OF No-FAULT

Since the 1960s, the motor vehicle accident reparations system
and the rules used to assess legal responsibility for motor vehicle
crashes and compensate victims have been the subjects of controversy.' The debate has centered around the costly and tedious process of determining who is at fault after vehicular crashes occur. In
an attempt to provide quick and fair compensation to the greatest
number of injured persons possible without the delays, costs and
uncertainty of recovery associated with the court system, no-fault
legislation was introduced in the 1970s in many states. Over the
last three decades, nearly 20 states have at one time or another experimented with no-fault accident reparations systems. Several of
these states have since repealed their laws or substantially modified
them. To this day, in fact, the no-fault system remains a source for
public debate and potential reform in some states. In certain
states, especially where the cost of automobile insurance is perceived as too high, changes to the system are being proposed to try
to reduce the claims expenses that drive the cost of coverage.
Under an automobile no-fault system, the vehicle owner's insurance company covers bodily injury expenses incurred by the
driver and his or her passengers, regardless of who caused the accident. Access to the court system is limited to those cases where
more serious injuries are incurred or when out-of-pocket expenses
1. For a more complete analysis of no-fault laws, see generally ROBERT H.
JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND No-FAULT LAw (2d ed. 1992).
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exceed a specified sum. This first-party coverage for losses is designed to provide prompt payments for economic losses, lower the
litigation costs associated with the tort system, and reduce or eliminate the costs for non-economic losses (i.e., pain and suffering).
The creators of no-fault had intended that tort liability be abolished and all accident injuries be compensated by insurers without
determining whether negligence played a role in the crash. This
original pure form of no-fault was never enacted in any state.
Where administered today, no-fault systems typically embody elements of both tort liability and fault-free compensation. Because
they do not abolish tort liability completely, these laws are often referred to as modified no-fault plans.
Ironically, in many no-fault states, tort liability is virtually unrestricted and, accordingly, there are still many accident-triggered
lawsuits. The system encourages those involved in a crash to overutilize medical and treatment services, hence accident compensation
often remains a slow process and the expenses of allocating fault
means bodily injury liability insurance costs are higher than they
should be. Under modified no-fault systems, a lawsuit in theory
should be a remedy in only a very small percentage of cases where
the nature of injury or the amount of damages would not be compensated fairly under a no-fault plan. In these states, access to the
courts is permitted if the bodily injury claim exceeds a tort threshold level, which may be either a monetary sum, a specified class of
injury, or a combination of both.
In theory at least, even modified no-fault plans are supposed to
limit the right to bring a lawsuit for an accidental injury. Under
these laws, the right to sue for minor automobile injuries is restricted and victims are provided personal injury protection (PIP)
benefits, regardless of who is at fault. A verbal threshold variety restricts lawsuits to recover non-economic damages to those cases
where serious injuries have been sustained. A "serious injury"
would generally be a specific physical condition, for example,
death, dismemberment, serious disfigurement, fractures or other
severe impairment. Under verbal threshold no-fault laws, it was
thought that lawsuits should be confined to only those cases where
severe injuries had occurred, and the right to seek redress in court
for subjective injuries and damages (i.e., pain and suffering, emotional distress, etc.) should not be impaired. In contrast, under a
monetary threshold no-fault plan, accident victims can sue if their
out-of-pocket expenses for medical care, wage loss, or other necesPublished by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
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sary services exceed a specific monetary sum stated in the law.
Today, 13 states have some type of no-fault system for the
compensation of persons injured in crashes. Of these states, Florida, Michigan, and New York are the only no-fault states with a verbal tort threshold. The remaining no-fault states have monetary
lawsuit thresholds, currently ranging from $1,000 to $5,000. Several of these also have a verbal threshold, in which case injured parties have the option of applying either an economic (dollar threshold) or a subjective degree of injury standard to determine whether
a tort lawsuit can be brought to recover non-economic damages. At
one time, most no-fault states had very low dollar thresholds (e.g.,
$200-$500 of medical expenses). These laws failed to reduce the
filing of tort liability suits because of the ease in accruing medical
diagnostic and treatment bills and thus quickly surpassing the
monetary threshold. In addition, low dollar thresholds created an
incentive to exaggerate the seriousness of the injury in order to
surpass the threshold. Monetary thresholds have been increased
over time in an attempt to match the rising cost of medical services
and to make it more difficult to file a lawsuit.
Kentucky, New Jersey and Pennsylvania now administer what
are known as "choice no-fault" laws. Under a choice system, vehicle
owners can select the no-fault process and collect benefits from
their own automobile insurer regardless of who is at fault. Tort
lawsuits are restricted but not eliminated in these states. Conversely, motorists can opt instead for a traditional tort liability system and coverages, and be able to sue other drivers on grounds of
negligence. In a true choice state, the tort-chooser often files a
negligence claim against his or her own insurer.
Ten states,' along with the District of Columbia, have laws that
require automobile insurers to offer personal injury protection
(PIP) benefits, which are "added on" to the existing tort liability
coverages. Some states require the purchase of add-on coverage,
while other states do not. Although PIP benefits are similar to
those provided in no-fault states, add-on laws are different in one
respect: there are no restrictions on the right to file a liability claim

2. The 13 states are: Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
and Utah. Connecticut, Georgia, and Nevada repealed their no-fault laws in 1993,
1991, and 1980, respectively.
3. Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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or lawsuit against another driver. As in no-fault states, however,
add-on PIP coverage compensates the insured for economic losses
(e.g., medical, wage loss, etc.) regardless of whose negligence
caused the injury.
At present, the remaining 27 states have traditional tort liability systems, under which there are no limitations on the right to assert negligence-based lawsuits. In full tort states, parties can sue to
recover both economic as well as non-economic or subjective losses
such as pain and suffering and emotional distress. In all but four of
these states, bodily injury and property damage liability insurance
must be acquired and maintained as a statutory condition of owning and operating a motor vehicle.
III. THE MINNESOTA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE SYSTEM
A.

Minnesota No-FaultLaw

Minnesota has administered a modified no-fault law, known as
the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, since January 1, 1975.
The law permits injured persons to sue for pain and suffering or
other non-economic damages if a monetary or verbal threshold or
qualifier is met. General damages (i.e., damages compensating for
non-economic losses) are recoverable only if injury results in permanent disfigurement or injury, disability (for 60 days or more),
fatality, or medical expenses exceeding $4,000. First-party PIP
benefits include a $40,000 limit on the following: $20,000 for medical expense loss arising out of injury to any one person; and a total
of $20,000 for income loss, replacement services loss, funeral expense loss, survivor's economic loss, and survivor's replacement
services loss arising out of the injury to any one person. Disability
and income loss benefits are capped at 85 percent of the injured
person's loss of present and future gross income, up to $250 per
week, and replacement service loss benefits and survivor's economic loss benefits are limited to $200 per week.
B.

MinnesotaAverage Liability Premium Outpaces NationalMean

According to data compiled by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the average Minnesota consumer paid an
annual premium of $713 for automobile liability and physical dam4.

See MINN. STAT. § 65B.44 (1996).
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age insurance in 1996.' Of that amount, 61% (or $437) of the total
premium went toward liability coverage.6
Minnesota is the twenty-fourth most expensive state in the
country for automobile liability and physical damage insurance; it
ranks twentieth highest in terms of liability coverage only. From
1987 to 1993, the average liability premium in this state was substantially lower than the countrywide norm. The slowing down of
the countrywide liability premium over the last three years has resulted in Minnesota's premium now being almost the same as the
national average. From 1987 to S71996, the average liability premium
increased 58 percent in Minnesota, rising at a higher pace than
the average of the other nine no-fault states (52%)s and the nation
(47%) .' Average liability premiums for Minnesota and the U.S. are
both lower than the aggregate of the no-fault states, demonstrating
that in spite of their faster growth in insurance rates, policyholders
in Minnesota are still paying lower amounts for protection than
their counterparts in other no-fault states combined, particularly
those in the Northeast.
C. Minnesota Drivers are FilingMore First-PartyInjury Claims Than
Before
Over the last five years, insurance companies have noted an
increase in the number of personal injury protection claims filed
and paid in the state. Such growth has helped to increase overall
PIP loss costs and, hence, rates paid by policyholders for this type
of coverage. According to the Fast Track Monitoring System report,
the PIP claim frequency, or number of claims per 100 insured cars,
in Minnesota increased 13 percent from 1992 to 1996.0 This,
5. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, STATE AVERAGE EXPENDITURES &
PREMIUMS FOR PERSONAL AUTO. INS. IN 1996 Table 3 (January 1998) [hereinafter
1996 EXPENDrrURES & PREMIUMS].

6.

See infra Appendix, Figure 1.

7.

See 1996 EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS, supranote 5, Table 4; NATIONAL ASS'N
OF INS. COMM'RS, STATE AVERAGE EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS FOR PERSONAL AUTO.
INS. IN 1991 Table 4 (January 1993) [hereinafter 1991 EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS].

8.
because
9.
10.

Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are excluded from this analysis
they have choice laws.
See infra Appendix, Figure 2.
See infra Appendix, Figure 3; NATIONAL ASS'N OF INDEP. INSURERS,

INSURANCE SERVS. OFFICE, INC., & NATIONAL INDEP. STATISTICAL SERV., FAST TRACK

MONITORING SYSTEM (3d Qtr. 1997) [hereinafter FAST TRACK MONITORING SYSTEM].
The Fast Track Monitoring System contains quarterly statistical personal automobile
loss experience, representing about two-thirds of the Minnesota premium volume.
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along with a 9 percent growth in average loss (i.e., claim severity),
have contributed to a 23 percent increase in loss cost since 1992.
In other words, it cost personal automobile insurers 23 percent
more to offer no-fault protection in Minnesota in 1996 than it did
in 1992.
D. RisingPIP Claim Severities in Minnesota Result in HigherAttorney
Involvement

Initially, a monetary threshold can eliminate some liability
claims and lawsuits, but its effectiveness diminishes over time. As
experienced in most other states, inflation has had an effect on the
cost of injury and other types of claims. From 1987 to 1996, the average claim severity for PIP coverage in Minnesota has grown 77
percent in the cost per injury claim ($4,353 vs. $2,453)."
As inflation reduces the value of the threshold, increasing
numbers of PIP claimants qualify for tort claims. Based on data
compiled by the Insurance Research Council, this trend is certainly
true in the case of Minnesota as the number of PIP claimants who
qualify for tort liability claims have more than tripled from 1977 to
1992. 2 In 1977, 10 percent of PIP claimants in Minnesota qualified
for a tort claim, compared to 22 percent in 1987; in 1992, this proportion jumped to 34 percent. As more injured parties file bodily
injury (BI) liability claims, it is expected that attorney representation will grow as well.
Compared to no-fault states in general, the proportions of BI
and PIP claimants represented by an attorney are higher in Minnesota. Thirty-two percent of PIP claimants in this state hired legal
assistance when they were involved in an automobile accident in
1992, while 29 percent of PIP claimants in all no-fault states sought
counsel.' 3 Moreover, 84 percent of BI claimants in Minnesota hired
an attorney,
compared to 81 percent of claimants in all no-fault
14
states.

It is jointly prepared by the National Association of Independent Insurers, Insurance Services Office, Inc. and National Independent Statistical Service.
11.

See infra Appendix, Figure 4; FAST TRACK MONITORING SYSTEM, supra note

10 (3d Qtr. 1997 & 4th Qtr. 1991).
12. See infra Appendix, Figure 5; INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO
INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPACT ON INS. COSTS 46 (September 1994)
[hereinafter CLAIMING BEHAVIOR].

13.
14.

See infraAppendix, Figure 6.
See CLAIMING BEHAVIOR, supra note 12, at 50-51.
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E. More Rapidly Growing ClaimingBehaviorin Minnesota
No-fault laws provide for injured parties to be compensated by
their own insurance companies, in an attempt to reduce the number of third-party BI liability claims and thus reduce a significant
One
portion of the average automobile insurance premium.
measurement of policyholder claiming patterns, used by the Insurance Research Council, is the ratio of bodily injury liability claims
per 100 property damage (PD) liability claims. This figure represents the likelihood of an injury claim being made, if an accident
resulting in vehicle damage occurs. In 1997, Minnesota had 10.3
paid injury claims per 100 vehicle damage claims, 15 lower than the
16
amount (17.7 claims) for the other eight no-fault states combined.
This ratio has been growing steadily at an overall rate of 78 percent
in Minnesota since 1980, compared to the 62 percent increase for
other no-fault states. 17 These figures suggest that while Minnesota
drivers currently are not claiming as many injuries as residents of
most other no-fault states, they have, however, been filing these
claims at an above-average pace over the last 17 years.
Minnesota has also out-paced the country as a whole in terms
of reporting injury claims since 1980. The national BI-to-100-PD
claim frequency ratio, however, is about three times higher than
Minnesota. This is not surprising, as the national average includes
tort states which have higher BI claim frequencies than Minnesota
and other no-fault states.
F

ComparisonsBetween Minnesota and Wisconsin

There are many similarities between Minnesota and its neighbor to the east, Wisconsin. For example, likenesses in geophysical
traits, climate, the size of their major urban areas and the demographics of the local population are obvious. Because of these similar characteristics, comparisons are often made between these two
states by policymakers and the public alike. The following discussion thus offers an examination of the automobile insurance sys-

15.

See

INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY

CLAIMS Tables A-1, A-25 (1996 ed.) [hereinafter TRENDS IN AUTo INJURY CLAIMS];
FAST TRACK MONITORING SYSTEM,

supra note 10 (3d Qtr. 1997).

16. Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are excluded from this analysis
because they have choice laws. Michigan is excluded because it has Property Protection Insurance instead of the standard Property Damage Liability coverage.
17. See infta Appendix, Figure 7.
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tems and related premium and loss experience of these two states.
1.

Automobile InsuranceSystems

There are more differences than similarities when the comparison measures motor vehicle insurance and accident reparations
rules.
Minnesota policymakers have created a more socialized
type of automobile insurance and accident compensation system
for their constituents, in the form of a modified no-fault law. This
law mandates the purchase and maintenance of certain insurance
coverages, providing motorists with a simple and certain financial
cushion in the event they are injured as the result of a motor vehicle crash.
Where automobile insurance is a mandatory requirement under Minnesota law, there is no governmental mandate to purchase
or maintain insurance in the state of Wisconsin. In comparison to
the highly structured no-fault plan in Minnesota, Wisconsin simply
follows traditional tort liability rules in resolving motor vehicle accident claims. 19 That is, motorists in this state retain an unrestricted right to bring an action based on negligence against a tortfeasor, no matter how inconsequential the damage. A financial
responsibility
law, known as the Wisconsin Safety Responsibility
20 ....
Act, is administered, requiring a driver to establish proof in the
ability to pay a judgment if he/she is found negligent for another
person's injury or damage in the event a motor vehicle crash occurs. Proof of financial responsibility can be established by showing the existence of an automobile liability insurance contract with
policy limits commensurate with the minimum limits required under law. It can also be established by depositing financial assets sufficient to pay a judgment entered as the result of a tort liability
cause of action. Accordingly, the primary automobile insurance
coverage in Wisconsin is bodily injury and property damage liability
insurance at limits adequate to meet the state's financial responsibility law.
Motorists residing in Wisconsin thus generally rely on two avenues of recourse for compensation of motor vehicle injuries. One
source for compensation is the set of benefits that may be available

18.
(2d ed.
19.
20.

See generally ROBERT H. JOOST, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
1992).
See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(4) (b) (Supp. 1998).
Id. § 344.01-.579 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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if an injured party is covered by a private health insurance plan or a
governmentally administered health-benefit program (e.g., Medicare). Another source is the civil justice system, where recovery is
not guaranteed and the time between injury and recovery of damages often can be years. While compensation for motor vehicle injuries in Wisconsin is largely dependent on whether a victim has
access to medical benefits or to the vagaries and chance of the tort
liability system, crash victims in Minnesota can recover a substantial
amount of economic or out-of-pocket losses through their own
automobile insurance company, regardless of whether their own
negligence contributed to the crash or injury.
It should be noted that Wisconsin does have a weak add-on
law, providing $1,000 of optional first-party medical expense indemnification similar to that found in Minnesota. Like the personal injury protection (PIP) coverage in Minnesota, the add-on
coverage in Wisconsin pays benefits for economic loss arising out of
a motor vehicle crash or incident regardless of fault. There are
significant differences, however. In Wisconsin, the add-on coverage is optional in nature and, with its nominal benefit level of
$1,000, it bears little resemblance to the mandated, higher-limit
PIP coverage that is the centerpiece of the no-fault law in Minnesota. The add-on benefits in Wisconsin are intended as excess coverage over any other source of reimbursement to which the insured
person has a legal right.
2.

Premium and Loss Experience

Another way in which the two states differ is in the cost of
automobile insurance. NAIC data show that Wisconsin has the
ninth lowest combined (liability and physical damage) average
premium in the United States, 18 percent lower than Minnesota.
Despite the substantial difference in both states' premiums, they
have risen at about the same pace (50%) over the last ten years.
The average liability premium in Wisconsin is the thirteenth
lowest in the nation, 28 percent lower than Minnesota's.

22

The

lower liability cost for automobile insurance in Wisconsin is attributable to several factors, including lower health care costs, lower

21. See infra Appendix, Figure 8; 1996 EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS, supra note
5, Table 3; 1991 EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS, supra note 7, Table 3.
22. See 1996 EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS, supra note 5, Table 4; 1991
EXPENDITURES & PREMIUMS, supranote 7, Table 4.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/4
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utilization of medical services reimbursed by automobile insurers,
fewer attorneys involved with injury claim representation, and a
more basic accident reparations and insurance system. Some may
perceive the Minnesota automobile insurance mechanism as more
sophisticated and socialistic by virtue of: (1) its mandatory coverages; (2) the potential to compensate a greater number of injury
victims more quickly under a no-fault insurance system; or (3) the
ability to access personal injury protection benefits regardless of
whether the injured party was negligent, owned an automobile, or
had an automobile insurance policy of his or her own. In addition
to having an accident reparations system that provides immediate
compensation for economic loss regardless of fault considerations,
motorists in Minnesota are not forced to trade away significant
limitations on their right to use the tort liability system. Because of
the low monetary threshold in the Minnesota no-fault law, motorists in the state are assured of the right to litigate injury claims that
are not very serious in nature, providing they accrue a rather moderate amount of medical bills, wage loss, and related economic expenses. All of these consumer-friendly features, however, come at a
price, resulting in the cost of automobile insurance in Minnesota
being a more expensive commodity than in the neighboring state
of Wisconsin.
More than $61 out of every $100 of the average insurance
premium in Minnesota are used to cover liability protection, while
a smaller proportion
of the premium in Wisconsin pays for these
23
coverages. As discussed below, residents of Minnesota are more
prone to seek legal counsel and pay substantially higher health care
costs than their neighbors to the east. In contrast, the portion of
the insurance premium that pays for vehicle theft, fire, and so on is
about the same in both states, while motorists in Wisconsin use a
greater portion of their premiums to pay for collision coverage
than their counterparts in Minnesota. The latter fact is attributable
to higher automobile collision repair costs in Wisconsin, as compiled by Automatic Data Processing Claims Solutions Group.24 In
1996, average costs reflecting parts, labor, towing and storage costs,
and so on ranked Wisconsin eighteenth highest in the nation and
Minnesota the thirty-second highest.
According to the Insurance Research Council, attorney in-

23.
24.

See id.; see infra Appendix, Figure 9.
ADP Claims Solutions Group is located in San Ramon CA.
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volvement in Wisconsin has been relatively low.25 Compared to 52
percent of BI claimants represented by counsel in all tort and addon states, the proportion of BI claimants represented by an attorney in this state was only 42 percent in 1992. In contrast, 84 percent of BI claimants in Minnesota hired an attorney; this is not surprising as residual injury claims in no-fault states are filed mostly by
people with more serious injuries (i.e., those who would seek representation).
Residents of Wisconsin also have the benefit of paying comparatively low hospitalization costs. Among the 44 states for which
data are compiled by Mutual of Omaha Companies in 1992-1996,
Wisconsin ranks tenth lowest in terms of total charge per admission
26
during this time period. Compared to Minnesota, there are 20
states with lower admission charges. Both Wisconsin's and Minnesota's charges are lower than the average of all 44 states. According
to Mutual of Omaha, the five-year average total charges per hospital admission for Wisconsin and Minnesota are $7,667 and $8,885,
respectively, while the 44-state average is $9,626.
As mentioned above, policyholders in Minnesota are filing injury claims more rapidly than before. Since 1980, the number of
injury claims per 100 damage claims rose 78 percent. This large
increase may be attributable to more people overcoming the tort
threshold and filing bodily injury liability claims. Wisconsin's
growth rate has been increasing as well, but much more slowly;
there are now only 20 percent more injury claims 9 er 100 damage
claims being filed in this state compared to 1980. This suggests
that Wisconsin motorists are not as apt to litigate their motor vehicle claim as residents of other states.
IV.

IMPROVING THE MINNESOTA SYSTEM

A no-fault law can create a more socially benevolent accident
compensation system where more injury victims receive more immediate compensation for their economic losses. When the cost of
providing no-fault benefits equals or exceeds the liability claim sav25.
26.

See CLAIMING BEHAVIOR, supra note 12, at 49-50.
See MUTUAL OF OMAHA COMPANIES' GROUP OPERATION

ANNUAL REPORT,

CURRENT TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND UTILIZATION 5 (1996 & 1997 eds.);
MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE

COMPANY GROUP ACTUARIAL REPORT,

CURRENT

TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND UTILIZATION 5 (1995 ed.).
27. See TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, supra note 15, Table A-51; FAST TRACK
MONITORING SYSTEM, supra note 10 (3d Qtr. 1997).
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ings accrued through restricting the right to litigate injury claims,
the no-fault system is dysfunctional or out of balance. The challenge for policymakers, therefore, is to develop and maintain a nofault system producing a significant enough reduction in bodily injury claim costs to exceed the cost of providing accident compensation (i.e., PIP benefits) without consideration of negligence to a
larger universe of claimants. Reducing liability-related claim costs is
a common objective of no-fault plans; the Minnesota No-Fault
Automobile Insurance Act is no exception. One of its introductory
provisions recites the legislative objective: "to prevent the overcompensation of those automobile accident victims suffering minor injuries by restricting
the right to recover general damages to cases of
28
serious injury."
A.

Conversion to Exclusive Verbal Tort Threshold

Policymakers in states that administer no-fault insurance laws
have increasingly examined new approaches to help rein in the
costs that drive automobile insurance premiums. Under study are
the continued filing of tort-based bodily injury liability claims and
the accrual of fault resolution expenses which, according to the
original designers and proponents of no-fault, were supposed to
have been abolished. Some states have amended their no-fault law
by deleting their monetary threshold in preference for an exclusive
verbal tort threshold. Monetary and verbal tort thresholds restrict
access to the tort liability system, preventing the overcompensation
of those sustaining only minor injuries, yet assuring those sustaining serious injuries the opportunity to seek compensation for intangible, non-economic damages. Some states have found that a
plural tort threshold (i.e., one encompassing both monetary and
verbal criteria for "serious injury") does not significantly reduce the
number of liability claims for non-economic damage. This in turn
adversely affects bodily injury liability claim costs and ultimately the
price of BI insurance coverage.
Several studies have shown that no-fault laws which feature a
single verbal tort threshold are more successful in containing the
growth in bodily injury claim costs.29 In addition, other commenta28.

MINN. STAT.

§ 65B.42(2) (1996).

29. For a more complete explanation, see Department of Legislative Reference, Research Division, General Assembly, No-FaultAuto Insurance:Does it Provide
Consumers More Benefits at a Lower Cost?, LEGISLATIVE REPORT SERIES, Vol. 8, No. 3,
(Dec. 1990); INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, PART
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tors have made the observation that no-fault laws which incorporate
monetary tort thresholds
1
• encourage
•30 the overconsumption of medical care and related services and, in some cases, fraud. Under nofault laws, motorists can use their PIP benefits to finance the medical services they incur. The more services consumed, the greater
the economic loss sustained by the motorist. Eventually, the injured person may consume enough medical services to reach the
monetary threshold and file a liability claim. Since tort liability
awards or settlements for general damages (e.g., pain and suffering) are determined by multiplying the amount of special damages
(i.e., actual out-of-pocket expenses) by two, three, or an even larger
number, there is a built-in financial inducement to generate and
exaggerate economic losses. In short, the economic incentive fostered under a monetary tort threshold no-fault plan can become
perverted and result in the over-treatment of minor injuries. At
some point, if bodily injury liability claim severities in Minnesota
were to become acute, one option that policymakers should consider is abolishing the no-fault law's monetary threshold in preference for an exclusive verbal tort threshold.
B. Implementation of ManagedMedical Care System
Close examination of claiming practices in some no-fault states
has shown an alarming and recurring pattern of some injured parties overutilizing medical services in an effort to generate a tort
claim. According to the American Hospital Association, the average cost per day at a community hospital increased 37 percent
($536 vs. $736) from 1990 to 1995 in Minnesota. 1 Policymakers
have searched for methods to help insurers contain medical costs
more efficiently, since these types of expenses make up a large portion of the PIP benefits paid by insurers in states with no-fault laws.
Personal injury protection coverage pays for all reasonable and
necessary medical care up to the policy limits. Under Minnesota's
law, the medical care provided to motor vehicle injury victims is on
a fee-for-service basis. This means that an injured party with access
to PIP coverage selects one or more doctors, seeks treatment, and
ONE: ANALvSIS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY (2d ed. February 1995); Brian W. Smith, Reex-

aminingthe Cost Benefits of No-Fault, CPCUJOURNAL, March 1989, at 28-36.
30. See STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., THE COSTS OF ExcEss MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR
AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES (Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corporation
1995) for a more complete analysis of the impact of monetary tort thresholds.
31.
See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATISTICS (annual).
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sends the bill for medical services to the automobile insurer. With
the growth of managed care in the Minnesota health and workers'
compensation insurance markets, 2 automobile PIP coverage remains the last unmanaged source of medical treatment reimbursed
through private insurance. This is a dubious distinction since it affords a haven for health care providers who have been left out of
the "managed care revolution" in other coverages. Whereas medical practitioners are limited to fixed-fee reimbursement under
other insurance and benefit programs, there are no ceilings or
rules that limit medical service compensation under the Minnesota
No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. This fact would make it attractive for medical providers to bill their automobile insurance patients at higher rates than other fixed-fee patients.
The policymakers in several states with no-fault laws have
seized the opportunity to contain automobile injury expenses by
authorizing insurers to use managed medical care on a voluntary
basis. In these states, insurance companies that wish to offer a
managed care program must file for approval from the state insurance department. Once permission is granted, the insurers then
provide consumers with the option of purchasing a policy under
which the insured agrees to select doctors and hospitals from a
health care network with which the insurers have a contract. This
system works much like the managed care program in the accident
and health insurance setting except that the consumer has the ability to accept managed care coverage in exchange for a lower premium, or reject it. Even when accepted, the insured can receive
medical treatment from providers outside of the insurance company network in emergency situations or if the accident occurs out
of the managed care network service area. A managed care system
benefits the consumer since it allows the policyholder an option to
get the same coverage but at a lower cost. It also encourages quality medical care by providers who are injury specialists.
Managed care systems compel network providers to treat patients and deliver services in the most efficient manner possible.
There would be no economic incentive for unnecessary and excessive medical treatments, thus managed care can eliminate over32. According to figures from the Minnesota Managed Care Review, over 60
percent of 1996 accident and health premiums in Minnesota were paid to health
maintenance organizations (HMOs). This does not include the percentage of the
health care market which is covered by preferred provider and other managed
care networks.
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treatment by medical providers. It also mitigates the questionable
services of insureds obtaining unnecessary treatment to "build up"
or accrue greater economic loss in order to meet a tort threshold
and initiate a liability claim. As long as policyholders receive
treatment in the managed care network, the overall cost of medical
care paid for by automobile insurance premiums is less, therefore
helping to keep the price of personal injury coverage as low as possible.
The experience in Colorado, the first state to adopt managed
care for PIP coverage in late 1991, provides some insight into the
potential impact of managed care in the automobile insurance system. During the four-year period prior to managed care, the Fast
Track Monitoring System shows that Colorado's PIP claim severity
increased 60 percent from 1987 to 1990.

After the system went

into effect, average PIP claim payments in the state dropped 4 percent over the next four years, while claim payments for similar coverage in other states continued to rise an average of 14 percent.
Even the PIP claim frequency has tapered off in Colorado during
the past five years; this has kept the loss cost (average loss per insured vehicle) for this insurance coverage from growing significantly, as it has countrywide. For all states offering PIP coverage,
the average PIP loss cost is now 23.5 percent higher than what it
was six years ago ($72.94 in 1996 vs. $59.06 in 1990), while Colorado's loss cost is now only 0.4 percent higher ($100.56 vs.
$100.20).
In other words, it now costs automobile insurers
throughout the country 23.5 percent more to offer PIP coverage to
their policyholders than in 1990; in Colorado, it costs insurers only
0.4 percent more.
It should be noted that managed medical care in automobile
insurance is not possible in states that administer more traditional
tort law systems where third-party liability insurance is the norm.
Automobile insurers have little ability to influence the medical care
chosen by persons injured through the negligence of their policyholders. Managed care thus requires a privity of contract between
insurer and insurance customer so that the provision of medical
benefits can be regulated and linked by the insurer to its medical
networks. Personal injury protection (no-fault) coverage provides
the privity of contract necessary to create a managed medical care

33.

See FAST TRACK MONITORING SYSTEM, supra note 10, (3d Qtr. 1997 & 4th

Qtr. 1991).
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coverage option.
C.

OtherMeasures

Since every no-fault automobile insurance act has unique provisions or benefit/coverage requirements that set it apart from
other similar accident reparations laws, there is no one formula or
template to follow in setting up a cost-benefit balanced no-fault system. Each of the 13 no-fault laws in the United States is in many
ways a reflection of the locale and its beliefs on accident compensation. If policymakers are concerned that the costs generated under
a no-fault law are outstripping its benefits or value, the following is
a list of other measures that can be considered to improve the
plan's operational efficiency:
* A first-party benefits package that balances the dual goals
of reimbursing out-of-pocket losses for most minor and
moderate injuries with the objective of promoting affordability of coverage;
* Peer review of medical services or, alternatively, implementation of medical service fee schedules for standardized
procedures and treatments similar to the system used in
state workers' compensation programs;
* Additional restrictions on the filing of tort liability claims
for the recovery of non-economic damages as, for example,
the use of an exclusive verbal tort threshold to limit liability suits to only the most serious cases;
• Elimination of duplicate payments for automobile crash injuries by exposing collateral benefit sources and assuring
that no-fault insurers operate as excess benefit payors in relationship to claims arising initially under state workers'
compensation or other governmental disability programs;
• Prohibitions against the "stacking" of coverages or limits;
* Statutory and other procedural penalties to function as deterrents against the filing of fraudulent claims and overbilling;
" Authority for no-fault insurers to use coordination-ofbenefit programs; and
" Flexibility for no-fault insurers to settle inter-company conflicts by contracting with alternative-dispute-resolution
providers of their choice.
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SUMMARY

This article has analyzed the performance and assessed the
value of Minnesota's no-fault accident compensation system in the
context of its effect on insurance claiming patterns and premiums.
In addition, the article has compared the accident reparations system in Minnesota with the insurance and injury compensation
rules in Wisconsin, and addressed public policy considerations
relevant to strengthening the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act.
Minnesota's average liability premium falls in the upper half of
all states, partly due to growing PIP claim frequency and to the average cost of these claims. Attorney representation in this state is
higher than average among PIP claimants, suggesting that people
in this state are more inclined to seek attorney representation.
These factors, along with inflation, have caused average PIP dollar
losses to grow over time, increasing on a per-claim basis by 77 percent over the last decade. In turn, the result is a greater number of
claimants surpassing the $4,000 monetary threshold and qualifying
for a tort claim.
Although most motorists in Minnesota file PIP claims, their
medical and other expenses usually do not exceed the $4,000
monetary threshold; hence, the rate of bodily injury liability claims
is substantially lower than average. This is a sign of an effective nofault system. While relatively few BI claims are filed compared to
the nationwide average, attorney involvement in these types of
claims is higher in Minnesota than the average no-fault state. The
higher utilization of attorneys is corroborated by the increased
number of injury claims filed for every 100 vehicle damage claims.
Compared to other no-fault states, drivers in Minnesota are filing
more injury claims, per unit of damage claims, than they were in
1980; in addition, the overall 17-year growth rate at which they are
being filed is higher in Minnesota than in other no-fault states
combined.
With regard to a comparison between Minnesota and Wisconsin, it is clear that the maxim, "getting what one pays for," is applicable to accident compensation systems as well. Minnesota automobile insurance consumers pay more than their counterparts in
Wisconsin to insure private passenger vehicles; they should, however, since the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act is a more comprehensive, robust accident compensation system than the very
modest tort liability system in Wisconsin. In Minnesota, consumers
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/4
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have the convenience of being served by their own insurance company. They receive immediate injury compensation (i.e., insurance
benefits) regardless of whether their own negligence contributed
to or caused an injury. Insured motorists in Minnesota involved in
"single-vehicle crashes," where automobiles make contact with fixed
objects, leave the pavement, or roll over, would be able to collect
no-fault accident compensation from their own insurer. In Wisconsin, under similar circumstances, the motorist would not have a
claim against another motorist or tortfeasor and could conceivably
find that his or her injuries are not compensable through automobile insurance.
No-fault benefits also provide compensation to a wider range
of injury victims, as coverage is not limited to the named insured,
family members, permissive vehicle users and guest passengers.
No-fault insurance systems such as the Minnesota Act provide compensation even to pedestrians and those who do not own an automobile. In Wisconsin, being hit by an uninsured motorist can
threaten the likelihood of obtaining injury compensation; under
no-fault systems, compensation for injuries caused by uninsured
drivers would not depend on whether the injured person maintained uninsured motorist insurance coverage. In sum, Wisconsin
residents who are injured in an automobile crash have no guarantees of being compensated for their injury. They must file a liability
claim against another motorist and can find themselves trying to
recover damages from another person's insurance company under
trying circumstances, i.e., where the other person and his or her insurer are contesting liability.
Another attribute of no-fault compensation systems that
greatly influences what consumers pay for automobile insurance is
the tort threshold or the limit on the right to recover for subjective,
non-economic injuries. It has been suggested that the purpose of a
tort threshold is to reduce the number of injured persons who are
eligible to make a tort claim and bring a lawsuit in tort. An effective tort threshold should reduce total tort payments enough to
equal or exceed the total cost of no-fault payments in a state and
reduce average bodily injury liability premiums in the state by an
amount equal to or greater than the average premium for PIP nofault insurance. A healthy, balanced no-fault plan will successfully
keep overall personal injury insurance premiums from rising, year
after year, more than the rate of inflation. Their efficacy in restricting access to tort liability payments (thus avoiding legal expenses
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
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and other costs and delays associated with using the civil justice system) to enough victims to prevent premium increases may have
diminished over time. Reasons might include the effect of medical
inflation, increased skill in overcoming thresholds, fabrication, and
claim buildup.
The health of a no-fault system should be monitored and reviewed periodically by the state lawmakers, just as the health and
well-being of a medical patient must be evaluated at regular intervals by a physician. If careful study suggests that bodily injury claim
costs, which partially drive rising automobile insurance premiums,
are rising in an alarming manner, Minnesota policymakers have
options available. They might, for instance, consider installing a
mechanism to adjust for medical cost inflation. The state insurance regulator could be empowered to multiply the dollar threshold component by a described inflation index. Another approach
would be to examine the adequacy of the verbal tort threshold; for
example, what percentage of tort liability claims in Minnesota is
predicated on qualification under the verbal threshold? If the
amount greatly exceeds the percentage of liability claims arising
from monetary threshold qualifications, the description of "serious
injury" may require re-engineering. Similarly, if monetary threshold liability claims are disproportionately larger than verbal threshold cases, the remedy might be to convert a plural threshold into
an exclusive verbal tort threshold.
Managed medical care programs would also be a constructive
approach to checking the increase in medical costs that are paid
for by automobile insurance premiums. A review of recent claiming trends in Colorado suggests that managed care is working as intended. Specifically, the average claim payments and, hence, loss
costs for PIP have been declining since the implementation of the
program. PIP claim frequencies are also lower than what they were
five years ago, when the system began in this state. It is believed
that enactment of managed care in Colorado has successfully kept
the cost of claims from being even higher. Without this system,
costs would continue to rise as demonstrated in other states. In order to slow the growth of medical claim costs in Minnesota and
thus help contain injury costs, local policymakers would be prudent
to consider authorizing insurers to introduce managed care programs.
Finally, as long as a state's no-fault automobile insurance plan
is a modified variety where elements of the tort liability system rehttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/4
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main intact, there will be multiple (i.e., liability and no-fault) costdrivers that affect the cost of insurance claims and, ultimately, the
price of automobile insurance. Minnesota has such a modified nofault law. Should policymakers in this state ever grow concerned
about rising automobile insurance premiums or question whether
their no-fault system is delivering adequate value to their constituents, they might consider the strategies examined and used by public officials in other states to improve the efficiency of modified nofault laws.

VI. APPENDIX OF FIGURES

Minnesota
Distribution of 1996 Average Auto Premium
by Coverage
Liability 61%

$156

Comprehensive 17%

Collision 22%
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners
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Minnesota Compared With
Other No-Fault States and the U.S.
Trends in Average Annual Liability Premium
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Growth in Minnesota
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Growth in Minnesota PIP Claimants
Qualifying for Tort Liability

Source: Insurance Research Council
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Minnesota vs. Wisconsin
Trends in Average Annual Premium
(Liability and Physical Damage Coverages)
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